This study supports existing evidence of adverse domestic and international economic and financial spillover effects of extreme political acts. The relationship between the variables in the model is greater after the 9/11 event than before; the effects are greater in developed compared to developing banking systems; and the adverse effects had not dissipated in period of relative stability up to late 2004. In addition, USA political riskadjusted banking returns together with world-banking system returns add new information in explaining country-banking system political risk-adjusted returns. This evidence should be heeded by risk managers and bank regulators in calculations of capital adequacy benchmarks to mitigate systemic flow-on effects.
Introduction
The motivation for this study stems from several facts as follows: The most significant and tragic extreme political act in USA history was the terrorist attack on the World The central issues addressed in this paper are as follows: How important was the effect of "9/11" on the USA-banking system? How important were spillover effects on other banking systems? Did these effects intensify after the attacks or did they dissipate in a period of relative stability to late 2004? Do pure political risk-adjusted banking returns variables add new information to international banking markets for the use of risk managers and bank regulators?
The paper is organised as follows: Relevant literature is discussed along with the concept of pure political risk. The data, model, methodology and preliminary analysis are then discussed. Finally, findings are reported and a conclusion and policy implications are noted.
Theory and literature
Authors such as, Blomberg et al (2004) and Anderton and Carter (2004) examined macro and microeconomic effects respectively, in relation to terrorism. Blomberg et al used regression and vector autoregressive (VAR) techniques to find that, on average, the incidence of terrorism may have a significant negative effect on growth. However, the effect is smaller and less persistent than that related to external wars or internal conflict.
They also find that terrorism involves the redirection of economic activity from investment to government spending and that there are differences in the incidence of and economic consequences of terrorism in different groups of countries. Terrorist incidences are more frequent in developing countries. However, negative influences of those activities on growth are smaller in developed countries. Anderton and Carter use utility maximisation and game theory models to demonstrate terrorist resource allocation choice effects and government counter-terrorism efforts and also the strategic interdependencies among terrorists and governments. Krug and Reinmoeller (2003) find through microeconomic analysis that the process of globalisation changes the supply of terrorist attacks and the costs of tolerating terrorist hazard. Adjustments in the gains of globalisation need to be made with the added terrorist risk. Bram (2003) finds that the "9/11" attacks created sizeable job and income losses in New York, but that New York's downturn, post "9/11", stems largely from other factors, such as the state of the national economy and the financial markets.
Other studies examine the impact of terrorism on specific industries. Blair (2002) investigated the economics of post "9/11" aid to airlines in the USA. Specifically Blair considered the merits of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilisation Acts passed by congress immediately after "9/11". Blair finds that the lack of profitability of the industry was due to structural problems within the industry as well as fear of further attacks. The overall weakness in the USA economy was also a factor. The symbolic role of government in providing a promise of financial support to the airline industry thrust the US government into a questionable role of setting industrial policy at a micro-level. Ito and Lee (2003) assessed the effects of "9/11" on US airline demand. They find a negative transitory shock as well as a negative demand shock. The latter had yet to dissipate and could not be explained by economic, seasonal or other factors. Liu et al (2003) examined and compared the reaction of financial markets to the real estate market post "9/11". They find that the subsequent week of share market closure gave market participants time to reconcile the complex impact of "9/11" on market prices. After "9/11" New York properties under-performed significantly compared to other US properties of a similar type.
De Mey (2003) finds both direct and indirect adverse effects on the insurance industry post "9/11" due to the substantial direct and indirect economic losses suffered by the City of New York. Brown at al (2004) examined the role of the US government in the market for terrorism reinsurance and investigated the negative stock market responses of affected industries prior to the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of . Poteshman (2003 finds, in an investigation of options market activity in the US in the days leading up to "9/11" that call option volume ratios and call volume indicators were at typical levels but that put option volume indicators seemed unusually high. Maillet and Michel (2005) investigated the impact of "9/11" on USA and French share markets. Using a methodology having a measure relying on an analogy with geophysics they find that the crisis triggered by "9/11" in the share markets was the worst since 1987 and the ninth worst compared to major historical crises Hon et al (2005) modelled conditional heteroskedasticity to find that international stock markets, particularly those in Europe, responded closely to USA stock market shocks in the three to six months after the crisis of "9/11" than before. Their evidence suggests that the benefits of international diversification in times of crisis are significantly lessened.
International spillover effects of crises in USA stock markets and currency markets have been previously examined (For example, King & Wadhwani, 1990; Hamao et al, 1990; Susmel & Engle, 1994; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000) . A comprehensive literature on financial market crisis and contagion is covered in De Bandt and Hartman (2000). Straetmans et al (2003) , in their main objections to spillover literature, say that correlation measures are non-robust to changing the underlying distribution assumptions of the return processes. They used extreme value analysis to assess whether or not downside risk measures such as value at risk and external sector linkages were significantly altered after "9/11". Their evidence indicates that the potential for domestic portfolio diversification during crisis periods decreased. In addition they find little support for a structural change in downside risk before and after "9/11".
Whilst the methodology of extreme value analysis is compelling, the study in this paper is unique, as it seeks to bring political risk factors into basic international banking market models The economic and financial component is objectively assessed as it is based on fact. It is not avoidable as it is the same for all. The unsystematic component is largely subjectively assessed and thus difficult to measure. However, this component of total country risk is avoidable through diversification. Political risk is the slowing down in the meeting of external commitments due to political factors such as riots, strikes and civil unrest. This is related to other factors such as, the degree of corruption in government, the history of 1 The basic international banking market models in this paper have been derived from the work in the area of portfolio theory by Markowitz (1959) and from the work in Capital Asset Pricing Models by Sharpe (1964) , Roll (1977) and Ross (1976) .
law and order, the quality of the bureaucracy etc. These factors have much to do with the social customs and cultural history of most countries.
Simpson (2002) examined a cross sectional sample of 1995 country and international banking risk ratings and economic and financial data and finds the following: First, the risk ratings from the leading ratings agencies are highly positively correlated. Second, country risk ratings may be largely replicated using primarily trade performance and debt serviceability data. Third, country risk ratings are also highly positively correlated with international banking risk ratings, thus reflecting the importance of banks as key economic agents. Fourth, pure political risk factors have a very small role in the ratings replication process. Finally, from a cross sectional analysis of risk ratings alone it is not possible to tell whether or not the ratings leads or lag either financial or economic crises.
In light of the problems within cross sectional studies, it is proposed in this study that pure political risk time series data be combined with country-banking returns data. Pure political risk scores are available through the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
The basis of this scoring system is described in the section describing political risk scores. There is a conceptual distinction to be made between country/sovereign risk and pure political risk.
The Literature on stock market returns and country risk
Most authors have not properly differentiated between country/sovereign risk and pure political risk. They have analysed country/sovereign risk ratings (which have stronger economic and financial components) rather than pure political risk (which incorporate subjectively quantified opinions on political outcomes). Despite this flaw, the questions asked over recent years by researchers, banking regulators and investors relate to the importance of the impact of country/sovereign risk factors on stock market returns in both developed and emerging markets. Another question is whether or not risk ratings lead or lag financial or other crises. In other words, do the risk scores add new information to stock markets?
Studies such as, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) , Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) , Maltosky and Lianto (1995) argued that rating downgrades are informative to equity markets, but find that upgrades do not supply markets with new information.
Cantor and Packer (1996) examined a sample of developed and emerging markets over the period 1987 to 1994 and find that risk ratings have a significant impact on bond yield spreads. Erb et al (1996) discussed the importance of an understanding of country risk for investors. They find that country risk measures are correlated with future equity returns but, financial risk measures reflect greater information. They also find that country risk measures are also highly correlated with country equity valuation measures and that country equity value oriented strategies generate higher returns. Diamonte et al (1996) used analyst's estimates of country risk. They find that country risk represents a more important determinant of stock returns in emerging rather than in developed markets. They also find that over the past 10 years country risk had decreased in emerging markets and increased in developed markets. They speculate that if that trend continues, the differential impacts of country risks in each of those markets will narrow. Hill (1998) finds that in times of crisis many investors may be determined to minimise exposure to politically risky securities until they have more information. However, after a period of calm the spreads being offered appear to be too high relative to the risks. After more investors return to the market the spreads get less and when there is another crisis the cycle recommences. Specifically in regard to the Asian currency crisis, Radelet and Sachs (1998) suggested that ratings agencies are too slow to react and when they did react their ratings intensified and prolonged the crisis. Ferri et al (1999) argued that the agencies behave in a procyclical manner by upgrading risk ratings during boom times and downgrading them during crises. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) argued that risk ratings agencies exacerbate boom-bust cycles in financial markets and put emerging markets at greater risk. Hooper and Heaney (2001) studied regionalism, political risk and capital market segmentation in international asset pricing.
They conclude that multi index models should incorporate a regional index, an economic development attribute, commodity factors and a political risk variable in order to more effectively price securities. Brooks et al (2004) argued that equity market reactions to ratings changes reveal significant responses following downgrades. Hooper, Hume and Kim (2004) find that risk ratings agencies provide stock markets and foreign exchange markets in the United
States with new tradable information, where ratings upgrade increase stock markets returns and decrease volatility significantly. They also discover significant asymmetric effects of ratings announcements where the market responses are greater in the case of ratings downgrades. Busse and Hefeker (2005) explored the connection between political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment flows (some of which is channeled into stock markets). They find that government stability, the absence of internal conflicts and ethnic tensions, basic democratic rights and the ensuring of law and order are highly significant determinants of foreign investment flows.
The evidence overall supports a "9/11 spillover effect" in economies, industries, and share markets. The evidence is mixed but, mostly points to country/sovereign risk having a significant relationship with stock market returns. Some of the above arguments imply that financial crises, as reflected in reduced stock market returns, are the drivers of sovereign risk ratings. If this is the case, risk ratings agencies do not contribute new information to financial and banking markets.
What is pure political risk?
Economic and financial risk has nothing overtly to do with pure political risk, although it is arguable that under the surface, the unwillingness to service external debt may be influenced by acute shortages of foreign exchange (Bourke & Shanmugam, 1990) . Pure political risk according to ICRG relates to political stability as evidenced by expert opinions collected, collated and categorised on areas as follows: Government stability, socio economic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, external conflict (where the ratings ascribed are out of 12), corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability (where the ratings are out of 6), and the quality of bureaucracy (where the ratings are out of 4). According to ICRG, in each category, the numerically higher the score or rating the lower the risk. The descriptions of the various components of pure political risk are included in Appendix 4.
The data
Daily banking stock market price index data for the world-banking system, the USAbanking system and sampled country-banking systems are converted to returns series.
The USA and the country-banking returns data are combined with political risk scores. For the purposes of this paper, the composite political risk scores (combining all of the pure political risk components and subcomponents as referred to in Appendix 4) ascribed by ICRG out of 100 for each country, are reversed to reflect that low numerical risk scores equate to low levels of risk and high numerical risk scores equate to high levels of risk. That is, composite political risk ratings out of 100 are extracted for each country in the sample and deducted from 100.
The resultant numbers are then multiplied by daily banking stock market index returns to arrive a country-political risk value associated with that country's banking returns. Low values of the country-banking system variable are associated with lower political risk for a given level of return. The data are analysed using the EViews (2001) statistical package. Note that during the analysis and findings reference occasionally is made to country-banking systems/variables, a world banking system/variable and the USAbanking system/variable. These variables, except for the world banking system variable, are country-banking system returns that are political risk-adjusted. The world banking system/variable is a world banking stock index returns variable.
The Model and Methodology
The first step is the specification of a basic systemic international banking market model of unlagged country-banking variables 2 regressed against the world-banking stock price index returns and the USA-banking variable.
2 Banking System Returns = A negative relationship between the US banking variable and the other country-banking variables means that higher political risk in the US banking system is associated with lower political risk in a country-banking system for a given level of return. A positive relationship between the world-banking returns variable and the country-banking system variables means that lower world-banking returns are associated with lower countrypolitical risk for a given level of country-banking returns. This would be consistent with the finance theory in the risk/return tradeoff and would make comment about relative riskiness in a country-banking system after an extreme political act.
Based on Granger (1988) findings that financial and economic time series may contain unit roots and on the development of the theory of non-stationary time series analysis, the unlagged regression models are re-specified into a model to implement VAR based tests of cointegration and causality. The international banking market VAR model involves lagged data in world-banking returns and country-political risk-adjusted returns from 
2)
By implication, all variables in the multivariate model described in Equation 2 are optimally lagged. Equations 1 and 2 are tested over the full period of the study and in a "before and after window" on the "9/11" event.
Preliminary analysis
Prior to testing the models, analysis is undertaken to demonstrate the basic facts and assumptions relating to the global influence of the USA-banking system. In this part of the analysis only prices rather than risk-adjusted returns are examined. The level series of prices are found to be non-stationary and the errors of associated regressions reveal serial correlation and heteroskedasticity according to Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests (Dickey & Fuller, 1981) , Durbin Watson (DW) tests (Durbin & Watson, 1971 ) and White tests. In the presence of serial correlation, the level series regressions are regarded as spurious.
The preliminary analysis moves to first differences. Each banking system in first differenced price index values is regressed on the world-banking system in first differenced price index values. All data are found to be stationary processes. The errors of the regressions are found to be stationary. The errors of the regressions are not serially correlated according to DW tests. However, heteroskedasticity is found to be persistent according to White tests. On that basis weighted least squares replace ordinary least squares (OLS) 3 regression analysis. 
Main findings
The first step following preliminary investigation is to undertake regression analysis of unlagged data testing the specified models that incorporate political risk ratings.
Weighted least squares regression analysis (See Equation 1) of unlagged data is examined
initially for the full period of the study by regressing each country-banking system variable on the world-banking system and the USA-banking system variables. These results demonstrate that there are statistically significant interrelationships between each country-banking system, the world-banking system and the USA-banking system over the full period of the study. The sizes of the adjusted R square values, coefficients and t statistics indicate that the developed country-banking system regressions of the UK and Australia exhibit greater explanatory power than the developing country-banking systems. The signs of the coefficients and t statistics show that there is a positive relationship between country-banking system variables and the world-banking system returns variable. That is, higher levels of world-banking returns are associated with higher levels of country-political risk-adjusted banking returns. This is consistent with theory in the risk return tradeoff and confirms greater financial integration of the developed country-banking systems with the USA system.
Regression analysis of unlagged data

Full period
A negative relationship exists with the country-banking system variable and the USAbanking system variable. That is, higher levels of political risk-adjusted banking returns in the USA-banking system are associated with lower levels of political risk-adjusted banking returns in the country-banking systems. The stronger interaction is also with the developed banking systems of the UK and Australia. As political risk in the USAbanking system increases, it is evident that perceived political risk in other sampled country-banking systems in the UK, Australia and in South East Asia reduces for a given level of banking returns. The study is then expanded to the before and after window of "9/11" to demonstrate the spillover effect.
Structural breaks tests for "9/11"
Each regression is tested at the 5% level of significance using Chow forecast and breakpoint tests including "9/11" as the date for testing. The values of the F statistics and log likelihood ratios and their significance provide confirmation of structural breaks in the data for each country-banking system regression except for that of the Philippines.
Periods before and after "9/11" Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis before and after the "9/11" attacks and compares the results to those from Table 2 system and the USA-banking system are not significant in the period before "9/11" but, are significant in the period after "9/11". The interaction of the developed countrybanking systems of the UK and Australia is greater than that for the developing countrybanking systems in the periods before and after "9/11" and during the full period of the study. It is evident that the "9/11" attacks induced structural changes in banking returns and political risk data, because after "9/11" the interrelationships in political risk and banking returns between country, world and USA banking systems are stronger. Spillover effects are also demonstrated. After the attacks there is a stronger positive relationship between world-banking returns and the country-banking system variables. This effect remains stronger in the developed country-banking systems of the UK and Australia. After "9/11", there is a stronger negative relationship between USA-political risk associated with USA-banking returns and political risks associated with country-banking returns.
VAR: Causality Analysis of Lagged Data
Equation 2 processes. Evidence of a long-term cointegrating relationship is found in each countrybanking model. However, the more important objective of this study is to examine exogeneity. Tests indicate an optimal lag order of 1-2. Using this VAR lag order, VAR based pairwise Granger causality/block exogeneity Wald tests are undertaken over the full period of the study, and then for the periods before and after "9/11", to confirm exogeneity. Significance levels were set at 5% for the sizes of the respective Chi Square values (See Appendices 1 to 3).
Full period
Granger causality results are summarised in Appendix 1. It is noted that, in each countrybanking system VAR, the USA-banking system Granger causes the world-banking returns system. In addition, the world-banking system does not significantly Granger cause the country-banking systems except in the cases of those for Thailand (at the 5% significance level) and the Philippines (at the 1% significance level). In the case of the UK banking system VAR, the USA-banking system is exogenous (significant at the 1% level). In the case of the Australian banking system VAR, the USA-banking system is exogenous (at a significance level of 1%). In the cases of the Thai and Philippines banking system VARs there is no significant evidence of exogeneity of the USA-banking system. In the case of the Malaysian banking system VAR, the USA-banking system is exogenous, but the evidence is not highly significant at the 10% level.
Period before "9/11"
Granger causality results are summarised for the period before "9/11" in Appendix 2.
Over the period from 31 st December 1999 to 10 th September 2001, the USA-banking variable is exogenous in the UK, the Australian and the Philippines banking systems (in the latter two cases the significance level is less, at 5%). There is no significant Granger causality running from the USA-banking system to the Thai or Malaysian systems. The USA-banking system and the world-banking system are exogenous when considered together interacting with each country-banking system (at significance levels of 1%). In each country-banking system VAR, the USA-banking system Granger causes the worldbanking system at a significance level of 1%. In the cases of the Philippines and the Malaysian banking systems Granger causality lies with the world-banking system at significance levels of 1% and 10% respectively.
Period after "9/11" Appendix 3 summarises the results of Granger causality tests for the period after "9/11".
In each country-banking system VAR, Granger causality runs from the USA-banking system to the world-banking system (at significance levels of 1%). In addition, the USAbanking system is exogenous (significant at the 1% level), when considered separately to the world-banking system, in each country-banking system except that of the Philippines.
In the case of the Thai banking system, the significance level of the exogeneity of the USA-banking system is less, at 5%. In the cases of the Philippines and Malaysian VARs, the world-banking system is exogenous with significance at the 1% level. In each country-banking system VAR, exogeneity lies with the world-banking system and the USA-banking system when these variables were considered together (with significance levels at 1% in each case). These relationships are stronger than before "9/11".
Conclusion
The "9/11" terrorist attacks were tragic examples of extreme political acts. The evidence of studies finding adverse macro-economic and micro-economic, industrial and spillover effects are generally supported in this paper. For example, macro and micro-economic effects (Blomberg et al, 2004; Anderton & Carter, 2004; Krug & Reinmoeller, 2003; Bram, 2003) ; industrial effects in the airlines industry (Blair, 2002; Ito & Lee, 2003) ; in real estate (Liu et al, 2003) ; in insurance (de May, 2003) ; in reinsurance and stock markets (Brown, 2004) ; in options markets (Poteshman, 2003) ; in stock markets (Mailler & Michel, 2005; Hon et al, 2005) and in spillover affects.
Banks are key economic agents. Banking system returns are also domestic and international economic indicators. This study differs from other studies in that an international banking market model has been adapted to incorporate pure political risk ratings (reflecting political, cultural and social factors) rather than country/sovereign risk ratings (largely reflecting finance and economic factors). For example, country/sovereign risk indicators were used by Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holt and Leftwich, 1992; Cantor and Packer, 1996; Erb, Harvey and Viskanta, 1996 . Fewer studies have more appropriately examined pure political risk effects in investment flows (For example, Busse & Hefeker, 2005) . The study expands on the use of single period regression models by also specifying bivariate models of optimally lagged data in order to test for cointegration and exogeneity.
When pure political risk-adjusted country-banking returns are incorporated into basic banking market models it is shown that the USA banking system is a powerful exogenous force in global banking. It is demonstrated that spillover effects of an extreme terrorist act in the USA are felt in related banking systems and economies. The models possess greater explanatory power after '9/11" than before. In addition, it is shown that the spillover effects are greater in developed banking systems than in the developing countrybanking systems studied over the full period of the study as well as in the periods before and after "9/11". The spillover effects of "9/11" had not dissipated up to late 2004. Pure political risk-adjusted banking returns of the USA included in country-political risk adjusted returns models, considered with world banking stock returns, are exogenous.
Therefore, new information is added by these variables which, should be of use to risk managers making portfolio diversification decisions and for banking regulators as they calculate economic and regulatory capital benchmarks of banking system safety.
